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Abstract
We propose that the monetary authority adopt the ination target as a time
varying policy instrument at the zero lower bound (ZLB) with the same zeal with
which they have adopted a xed ination target away from the ZLB. After an
extreme adverse shock reduces demand, the monetary authority promises future
ination by raising the ination target in the Taylor Rule. Time paths for ination
and output closely approximate those under optimal policy with the advantages that
it is communicable using the language of the ination target and implementable
using the Taylor Rule.
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1 Introduction
Once the nominal interest rate reaches the zero lower bound (ZLB), monetary policy
looses the ability to stimulate the economy by further reducing the nominal interest rate.
Yet, the monetary authority retains the ability to stimulate by promising future ination,
thereby reducing the current real interest rate. The zeal with which many monetary
authorities have adopted ination targeting could be extended to using the ination target
as a policy instrument at the ZLB. An increase in the ination target raises inationary
expectations, thereby reducing the real interest rate, even at the ZLB, and stimulating
the economy.
Monetary policy in the standard New Keynesian model is characterized by a Taylor
Rule, whereby the nominal interest rate is set to equal a target, comprised of the sum of
targets for the real interest rate and ination, and to respond strongly to deviations of
ination and output from their respective targets. Woodford (2003, p. 287) has shown
that the real interest rate target should be time varying and follow the natural interest
rate when the economy is away from the ZLB. We argue that the ination rate target
should also be time varying after the economy reaches the ZLB.
Woodfords argument is that a Taylor Rule with a time-varying interest rate target
implements optimal monetary policy away from the ZLB. Optimal policy is a series of
values for the interest rate target such that the interest rate follows the natural rate.
However, an interest rate rule, which sets the interest rate at the natural rate, admits
multiple equilibria, and therefore does not implement optimal policy. In contrast, the
Taylor Rule adds a strong response of the interest rate to deviations of ination and
output from their targets assuring that the equilibrium is locally unique.
We show that a simple extension of Woodfords Taylor Rule, which implements opti-
mal policy away from the ZLB, is able to implement a policy which closely approximates
optimal policy, even around the ZLB. We propose that the monetary authority introduce
time-variation to the ination target in a truncated Taylor Rule. In normal times, the
ination target takes on a value of zero, consistent with optimal policy under both discre-
tion and commitment. In the event of an adverse demand shock, severe enough to send
the economy to the ZLB, the monetary authority announces and commits to a positive
path for the ination target. The ination target rises to a positive value and retains this
value until the period after exit from the ZLB, whereupon it falls at a preannounced rate.
This simple characterization of the path for the ination target assures that it is easily
communicable. The ination target and its rate of decline are both chosen to minimize
expected loss.
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The positive ination target postpones the date of exit from the ZLB, compared with
optimal discretion, and creates the expectation that exit will occur with positive values
for ination and the output gap. Both the postponed exit date and the positive ination
upon exit stimulate current ination and output. Ination and the output gap overshoot
their long-run equilibrium values of zero, but magnitudes are small with ination never
larger than 0.1% at an annual rate. Additionally, the equilibrium time paths for ination
and the output gap closely approximate those under optimal policy at the ZLB, implying
that our policy yields almost identical loss with optimal policy. In contrast, loss under
discretion is much larger and is increasing in both the magnitude and the persistence of
the adverse shock.
These results imply that the Taylor Rule with a time-varying ination target can be a
close approximation to optimal policy at the ZLB. Our policy provides a way to implement
and communicate a monetary policy which closely approximates optimal monetary policy
once the economy reaches the ZLB. Additionally our policy yields much lower loss than
optimal discretion.1
We also consider the possibility of using the time-varying ination target to stimulate
the economy su¢ ciently to completely avoid the ZLB in the event of the extreme shock,
something like the proposals by Krugman (1998) and Svensson (2001, 2003) to exit a
liquidity trap by promising higher ination. The key here is the persistence of the ination
target. With su¢ cient persistence, an increase in the target can actually increase the
nominal interest rate because the increases in output and ination, due to the higher
inationary expectations, can be large enough to o¤set the e¤ect of the larger target itself
on the nominal interest rate.2 Therefore, we nd that we can avoid the ZLB completely,
even after the extreme adverse event. However, the welfare costs are large. The policy
of avoiding the ZLB yields adjustment paths with large and falling positive deviations,
whereas optimal paths have small positive and negative deviations. Since welfare loss is
measured by squared deviations, the policy yielding positive and falling deviations has
larger loss. Welfare costs after hitting the ZLB are necessarily lower than those in Coibion,
Gorodnichenko, and Wieland (2012), who study monetary policy with an ination target
xed high enough to virtually eliminate the possibility of ever hitting the ZLB.
Our paper is related to other papers which address monetary policy at the ZLB. Adam
1Our policy does require commitment, but arguably not more than required by the Taylor Rule promise
to "blow up" (Cochrane 2011) the economy in the event of a sunspot shock.
2The coe¢ cient on ination target is the sum of the positive coe¢ cient on the target itself plus the
negative coe¢ cients on the terms representing responsiveness of the nominal interest rate to deviations
of ination and the output gap from targets. The Taylor Principle yields a negative coe¢ cient on the
ination target.
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and Billi (2006, 2007) and Nakov (2008) have analyzed optimal policy under discretion
and under commitment when autoregressive demand shocks yield the possibility of the
ZLB. They do not explicitly consider implementation. Cochrane (2013) shows that the
discretionary commitment to exit the ZLB with zero values for ination and the output
gap yields a unique equilibrium at the ZLB. But, he also argues that if the policy maker
could commit to exit the ZLB at di¤erent values for ination and the output gap, this
could yield a preferable equilibrium during the ZLB. Krugman (1998), Eggertson and
Woodford (2003), Adam and Billi (2006), and Nakov (2008) demonstrate that optimal
monetary policy with commitment relies on an increase in inationary expectations to
leave the ZLB.
These policies work within the connes of a simple New Keynesian model, in which
the e¤ects of monetary policy are transmitted through the real interest rate. Much of
the literature on monetary policy in a liquidity trap expands policy to unconventional
methods, which are e¤ective to the extent that nancial-market arbitrage is imperfect,
that the monetary authority assumes risk on its balance sheet, and/or the quantity of
money has an e¤ect on the economy independent of its e¤ect on the real interest rate.
These policies are interesting and potentially useful, but the simple New Keynesian model
is not complex enough to provide a role for them.3 In a similar context, Williamson (2010)
argues that there is no ZLB, in the sense that the monetary authority can always nd
some stimulative instrument. This instrument can be unconventional monetary policy,
but we argue that it can also be a time varying ination target.
Additionally, Werning (2012) and others have proposed that when conventional mon-
etary policy looses its e¤ectiveness, government can turn to scal policy.4 However, the
scal response following the nancial crisis which began in 2007 has been highly political
and unreliable. The unreliability of a scal response, together with the uncertainty over
the magnitude of scal multipliers, implies that governments cannot rely on scal policy
as a stabilization tool.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents optimal monetary policy
in the simple three-equation New Keynesian model. We begin with a demonstration that
the Taylor Rule with a time-varying intercept can be used to implement optimal policy
as long as the implementation does not imply that the nominal interest rate falls below
zero. Section 3 presents our proposal that the monetary authority adopt the time-varying
3Examples of unconventional monetary policy include Auerbach and Obstfeld (2004), Blinder (2000,
2010), Bernanke (2002), Bernanke and Reinhart (2004), Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack (2004), Clouse
et.al. (2003) and Gurkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2004,2005).
4Some unconventional monetary policies are arguably scal policies.
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ination target after a severe adverse demand shock that sends the economy to the ZLB.
Section 4 uses our policy to avoid the ZLB, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Monetary Policy in the Simple NewKeynesian DSGE
Model
2.1 Simple New Keynesian Model
Following Woodford (2003) and Walsh (2010), we represent the simple standard lin-
earized New Keynesian model as an IS curve, derived from the Euler Equation of the
representative agent, and a Phillips Curve, derived from a model of Calvo pricing (Calvo,
1983). The linearization is about an equilibrium with a long-run ination rate of zero.5
yt = Et (yt+1)   [it   {  Ett+1]  ut (1)
t = Et (t+1) + yt: (2)
In these equations yt denotes the output gap; ination (t) is the deviation about a
long-run value of zero; it denotes the nominal interest rate, with a long-run equilibrium
value of { = r = 1 

; with r dened as the long-run real interest rate;  represents
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution with   1,  represents the degree of price
stickiness;6  2 (0; 1) denotes the discount factor; and ut represents the combination
of shocks associated with preferences, technology, scal policy, etc. Following Woodford
(2003, Chapter 4), we do not add an independent shock to ination in the Phillips Curve.7
This restricts the analysis to the case where monetary policy faces no trade-o¤ between
ination and the output gap.
5This does not require that the ination rate be zero in the long run, only that it not be so far from
zero to make the linearization inappropriate (Woodford 2003, p. 79).
6 = (1 s)(1 s)s
 1+!
1+!" , where s 2 (0; 1) represents the fraction of randomly selected rms that cannot
adjust their price optimally in a given period. Therefore, s = 0 )  ! 1 ) complete exibility and
s = 1)  = 0) complete stickiness. Hence,  2 (0;1)) incomplete exibility. ! > 0 is the elasticity
of rms real marginal cost with respect to its own output, " > 0 is the price elasticity of demand of the
goods produced by monopolistic rms. See, Adam and Billi (2006) and Woodford (2003) for details.
7Adam and Billi (2006) demonstrate that calibrated supply shocks are not large enough to send the
economy to the zero lower bound.
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2.2 Policy to Choose Nominal Interest Rate
2.2.1 Optimal Policy
The model is completed with determination of the nominal interest rate. We consider
two alternative methods to specify the nominal interest rate. The rst follows Woodford
(2003), and chooses values for the time paths of ination and the output gap to minimize
the loss function,
Lt =
1
2
Et
1X
j=0
j
 
2t+j + y
2
t+j

;  2 [0;1): (3)
Woodford derives equation (3) as a linear approximation to the utility function of the
representative agent when equilibrium ination is zero and the exible-price value for
output is e¢ cient.8 When the only shock is to the Euler equation, it is optimal to set
t = yt = 0: Given these values, it is straightforward to show that the optimal value for
the nominal interest rate is
it = {   1ut = rnt ; (4)
where rnt is dened as the natural rate of interest.
According to equation (4), a reduction in the demand for current output (a rise in
ut) reduces the natural interest rate and should be o¤set by a reduction in the nominal
interest rate. The nominal interest rate should remain lower as long as demand and the
natural rate are lower. An interest rate which fully o¤sets demand shocks keeps ination
and the output gap both at their target values of zero. A nominal interest rate, set
according to equation (4), is compatible with the target values of zero for ination and
the output gap.
However, if equation (4) is used as the interest rate rule, then there are also many
other equilibrium values for ination and the output gap in addition to the target values.
An interest rate rule like equation (4) leaves the price level indeterminate. Sargent and
Wallace (1981) were the rst to raise the issue of indeterminacy in the context of a policy
which xes the nominal interest rate. Hence, the monetary authority cannot implement
optimal policy using equation (4) as an interest rate rule. Equation (4) determines the
equilibrium value of the optimal interest rate, but it does not explain how the monetary
authority can achieve it.
8The government can subsidize rms to increase production to the perfectly competitive level.
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2.2.2 Taylor Rule
The method, typically employed in NewKeynesian models for determining the nominal
interest rate, is to assume that the monetary authority follows a Taylor Rule. In Taylors
original rule, the nominal interest rate is set to equal a xed real rate plus a xed ination
target and to respond positively to deviations of ination and output from xed target
values. The Taylor Rule can be expressed as
it = r
 +  + ' (t   ) + 'y (yt   y) ; ' > 0; 'y  0: (5)
Allowing the interest rate to respond strongly to endogenous variables solves the prob-
lem of indeterminacy which arises if equation (4) is treated as an interest rate rule. Specif-
ically, Bullard and Mitra (2002) demonstrate that if ' and 'y are large enough such that
equations (1) and (2), with equation (5) for the interest rate, yields a dynamic system
with two unstable roots, corresponding to the two forward-looking variables, then the
equilibrium is unique. This condition has been labeled the Taylor Principle.9
Woodford (2003) demonstrates that it is possible to use the Taylor Rule to imple-
ment10 optimal monetary policy by following a Taylor Rule with a time-varying intercept
(rt + 
). Erceg, Henderson, and Levine (2000) and Woodford (1993, 246) also use Tay-
lor Rules in which a time-varying intercept can be chosen by the monetary authority.
Woodford sets  = 0; and lets rt be time-varying. Optimal policy can be implemented
with
rt = r
n
t : (6)
Substituting equation (6) into equation (5), setting  = 0; and substituting the Taylor
Rule with this optimal policy into equations (1) and (2) sets ination and the output gap
at their target values of zero.11 At equilibrium values for the output gap and ination of
zero, the interest rate equals the optimal interest rate in equation (4), Woodfords (2003)
natural rate of interest.
The equilibrium solution is independent of the values for ' and 'y as long as they are
large enough to assure two unstable roots.12 Therefore, it is important to understand the
role of these policy parameters. The promise to respond strongly to any sunspot shocks
that raise ination and/or output, in Cochranes (2011)words, "to blow up the economy"
9The Taylor Principle originally referred to requiring ' > 1; but has been generalized to allow the
nominal interest rate to respond to both ination and the output gap.
10Implementability requires local uniqueness of the rational expectations equilibrium.
11Any other values yield an explosive equilibrium, which we rule out.
12The criteria for two unstable roots is:  ('   1) + (1  )'y > 0:
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in the event of sunspot shocks, serves to rule out sunspot equilibria and to assure a unique
equilibrium. Therefore, we can obtain a unique equilibrium in which the interest rate is
given by equation (4) only if the monetary authority follows an interest rate rule like
(5), which di¤ers from equation (4) by this extraordinary promise. And it must have the
ability to commit to this threat. This requires that the monetary authority be completely
transparent, communicating the intention to "blow up the economy" and that this threat
be completely credible. This is because ' and 'y do not show up in the equilibrium
solution and therefore cannot be inferred from any observable evidence.13
3 Zero Lower Bound
The above policy is feasible only if the demand shock is never large enough to send
the nominal interest rate below zero. We are interested in policy which is e¤ective in the
event of those severe adverse demand shocks. We propose allowing the ination target in
the Taylor Rule to be time-varying.
There is empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that actual monetary policy has
operated with a time-varying ination target in the Taylor Rule. Ireland (2007) argues
that US ination can be explained by a New Keynesian model with a Taylor Rule only
if the ination target is allowed to vary over time. Additionally, Kozicki and Tinsley
(2001), Rudebusch and Wu (2004), Gurkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) and Dewachter
and Lyrio (2006) provide evidence of a time-varying short-run ination target for the
US. Krugman (1998), Svensson (2003), Eggertson and Woodford (2003), Adam and Billi
(2006), and Nakov (2008) all suggest policies which increase expected ination at the
ZLB.
3.1 Taylor Rule with Time-Varying Real Interest Rate and In-
ation Targets
The Taylor Rule with the real interest rate target equal to the time-varying natural
rate and with a time subscript on the ination target is given by
it = r
n
t + 

t + ' (t   t ) + 'y (yt   yt ) ; (7)
13Cochrane (2011) emphasizes that at the optimal equilibrium, values for ' and 'y do not a¤ect the
equilibrium. Woodford (2003, p. 288) makes the same point. If there were shocks to the Phillips Curve,
or if the intercept to the Taylor Rule did not vary optimally, then we would have evidence on the values
of ' and 'y. However, we would not have evidence that the monetary authority would actually "blow
up" the economy in the event of a sunspot shock.
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where, following Woodford (2003), we interpret yt as the value for the output gap from
equation (2), when ination takes on its target value, yielding
yt =
t   Et
 
t+1


=
t (1  )

: (8)
3.1.1 Demand Shocks
The policy we propose is invoked only in the event of a severe adverse demand shock.
We choose to model shocks which send the economy to the ZLB di¤erently from the
standard literature. An example of standard modeling is Adam and Billi (2006). They
calibrate stationary AR(1) shocks, using quarterly data over the period 1983-2002, and
nd that under policy with commitment, the economy would experience a ZLB one quar-
ter every 17 years and that the ZLB would last between one and two quarters. With
discretionary policy, Adam and Billi (2007) nd that the more aggressive lowering of the
nominal interest rate, as the natural rate moves toward zero, increases the frequency with
which the economy hits the ZLB, but they provide no adjustment to their frequency and
duration calculations in Adam and Billi (2006).14
The problem with modeling shocks creating the ZLB based on a sample with no ZLB
is that the economy seems to hit the ZLB less frequently than predicted, and once there,
seems to remain much longer than predicted. The US has experienced two periods of very
low nominal interest rates in the 153 years between 1860 and 2013 (Clouse et al 2003 for
earlier data), and both of these have been extremely protracted. Therefore, it is arguable
that the ZLB is the result of a gigantic shock a rare event a Great Depression or a
Financial Crisis something like falling o¤ a cli¤ instead of slipping slowly down a hill.
Additionally, the two episodes of the ZLB in the US have yielded deep and long-lived
recessions in contrast to the predictions in Adam and Billi (2006).
Therefore, we model demand shocks (ut) as comprised of two components, the normal
AR(1) component (vt), like that observed in the Adam and Billi (2006) sample, and a
large shock which represents a rare event (wt), yielding
ut = vt + wt:
Since we have experienced only two instances of the ZLB in the US over 153 years, we
deviate from Adam and Billi (2006) and assume that the distribution of innovations to
14Since Jung et al (2005) nd that commitment requires exit from the ZLB at a latter date than
discretion, perhaps with discretionary policy, the economy would hit the ZLB more frequently, but remain
there for shorter periods of time.
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the normal AR(1) shock is such that even if we received the worst realization forever, we
would never breech the ZLB. We are assuming that economies do not slip down the hill
toward the ZLB. This assumption seems consistent with the data and implies that the
probability of hitting the ZLB is independent of the economys current state. Therefore,
we do not compare the e¤ect of alternative policies on the frequency of hitting the ZLB
since our assumption implies that the frequency is independent of policy. We model
small AR(1) shocks by assuming that the innovations (~vt) are drawn from a symmetric
bounded normal with bounds ( v; v) tight enough that even if the economy received the
worst shock forever, it would never breech the ZLB. The normal AR(1) disturbance is
modeled as
vt = vvt 1 + ~vt 0 < v < 1
with
v
1  v
 {: (9)
In contrast, the rare event is drawn from the time-varying Wt distribution, which has
only large and symmetric elements. A draw from the Wt distribution puts the economy
in either the best or worst possible state, unconditional on the current state. There are
two equally probable elements at any point in time, given by
wt 2 fw   vvt 1;  w   vvt 1g :
The time varying component allows the shock from theWt distribution to put the economy
in the worst or best possible state, unconditional on its prior state. If the shock is negative,
it sends the economy to the ZLB
w > {:
We allow the stochastic behavior of the economy to change after receiving the extreme
shock, given by w. First, we assume that the shock deteriorates at rate w; where we
explicitly allow persistence to be higher than that of the ordinary shock in order to model
the long durations of the ZLB. This requires
w  v:
Second, to simplify the solution of the model, we rule out the possibility that either
another draw from the W distribution or AR(1) shocks to vt could send the economy
back to or beyond the "worst possible state." Therefore, we assume that the economy
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cannot receive another shock from the W distribution until after it has recovered from
the current one. Additionally, we assume that variance for the V distribution is small
enough that the value of the demand shock is expected to fall over time as the value of
the extreme shock decays. This requires at a minimum the additional assumption
w  

v
1  w

= ! > 0: (10)
Assume that in period one the economy receives the adverse draw from the W dis-
tribution putting it in the worst possible state. Given these assumptions, the demand
disturbance for periods t  1; can be represented by
ut = vt + 
t 1
w w;
where v1 = 0:
3.1.2 Ination Target at the ZLB
Our policy for more aggressive use of the ination target at the ZLB is the following.
In normal times, when shocks are drawn from the V distribution, the ination target is
xed at zero. However, following a large adverse shock in period 1, the ination target is
reset away from zero to
1 = 
 > 0:
The ination target retains this value into period T + 1; the period in which the economy
emerges from the ZLB. Thereafter, the ination target evolves as
t = 
 (T+1 t)
 
 t  T + 1: (11)
Both  and  are policy variables chosen by the monetary authority to minimize loss,
given by equation (3). In a regime of certainty, choices for  and  yield a unique value
for T , the nal period at the ZLB.15 With uncertainty, they yield a unique expected exit
time.
Using equation (8) for yt to substitute into the interest rate equation (7), and collecting
15Raising the ination target for an adverse shock imparts a small permanent ination bias to the
economy in normal times. This is due to the small probability that the ination target will be raised.
However, we will show that the ination target is so small, that multiplied by the probability of the rare
event, the ination bias is miniscule.
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terms on t yields
it = r
n
t   zt + 't + 'yyt; (12)
where rnt is given by
rnt = {   1ut; (13)
and z is a constant given by
z = ' + 'y

1  


  1 > 0; (14)
with the inequality implied by the Taylor Principle. Since the interest rate cannot be
negative, it follows a truncated Taylor Rule such that
it = max
 
0; rnt + 't + 'yyt   zt

; (15)
where the value for rnt is stochastic since the economy can continue to receive shocks from
the V distribution after receiving the extreme negative shock.
Our policy of raising the ination target in the event of an extreme adverse shock
requires no current action for implementation, but does a¤ect expectations about future
policy actions. Are these announced future actions credible?
Any policy contains implicit or explicit promises for future action. Credibility is an
issue when the promise is dynamically inconsistent, and ours is. However, the dynamic
inconsistency is not related to whether or not the promise of future action is accompanied
by current action or not. The fact that a particular policy requires no current action for
implementation would not seem to make announcements about future actions any less
credible than if the policy also required current action. In either case, if the authority can
commit to a policy, and commitment is required even to follow a Taylor Rule, then the
authority will not reoptimize each period. If a policy maker has crediblity, then a rational
expectations equilibrium requires that agents expect the policy maker to act as he has
announced, whether the policy-maker is currently acting or not. The fact that monetary
authorities are using forward guidance on interest rates as a policy instrument suggests
that they have credibiity.
11
3.2 Model Solution
3.2.1 Certainty
To solve the model, we initially assume that there is no additional uncertainty following
the large adverse shock and set the variance of innovations from the V distribution to zero.
This assumption permits analytical solution and facilitates comparison with the results
to those of optimal policy under commitment and under discretion. Subsequently, we add
a moderate amount of uncertainty, consistent with our assumptions above, and compare
simulations of time paths under certainty with expected time paths under uncertainty.
Our solution under certainty follows Jung et al (2005) who separate time at T , dened
as the nal period in which the nominal interest rate is zero. We solve for time paths
after the extreme adverse shock.
Periods t = 1; 2; :::; T For t  T; the value for the nominal interest rate is zero. Write
equations (1) and (2) with it = 0 as
Zt+1 = AZt   arnt (16)
where,
Zt =
"
yt
t
#
and
A =
24 1 +    
 

 
1

 35 ; a = " 
0
#
:
A forward looking solution of equation (16) yields
Zt =  t + A
 (T t+1)ZT+1 (17)
where,
 t =
TX
k=t
A (k t+1)arnk :
Equation (17) implies that values for deviations of ination and the output gap prior to
exit from the ZLB depend on their expected values on the date of exit from the ZLB. The
promise to exit the ZLB with positive values for ination and the output gap stimulate
the economy while at the ZLB. Additionally, postponement of the exit date with a larger
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value for T , stimulates since the coe¢ cients in the A (T t+1) matrix are increasing in
T . The Taylor Principle upon exit implies a unique value for ZT+1, thereby assuring
uniqueness prior to period T + 1.
Periods t = T + 1; T + 2; ::: In the period in which the economy exits the ZLB, the
nominal interest rate becomes positive and remains positive. Substituting the nominal
interest rate from equation (15) where the ination target is given by equation (11), into
equations (1) and (2) yields
Zt+1 = 
Zt   azt (18)
where

 =
"
1 + 

'y +





'   1

 

1

#
:
When the Taylor Principle is satised, z > 0 and both characteristic roots of 
 exceed
unity. Therefore, initial values must be determined to set the coe¢ cients on both roots
equal to zero. Letting the characteristic roots be denoted by 1 and 2; the solution of
equation (18) yields unique non-explosive solutions for the output gap and ination after
the nominal interest rate becomes positive as
Zt = b

t (19)
where
b =
"
(1 )z
(1 )(2 )
z
(1 )(2 )
#
for t  T + 1.
Optimal Value for Ination Target The monetary authority chooses the value for
the ination target () and its persistence () on the date of the shock and commits to
both. Both are chosen to minimize loss in equation (3).
The nominal interest rate in the exit period is determined by substituting for yt and
t, from equation (19), into equation (15) to yield
it = r
n
t + qz
 (20)
where
q =
'+ 'y (1  )
 (1   ) (2   )
   1;
13
and z is given by equation (14). The value for T + 1 is the rst period that it in equation
(20) becomes positive.
Increases in  and  both raise inationary expectations, stimulating output and
ination. However, they have opposite e¤ects on exit time. Exit time is the rst time
that the natural rate (rnt ) is large enough to o¤set the negative value for qz
: The natural
rate is expected to rise over time as it shock component decays at rate w. For small values
of , the value for q < 0; and qz is increasing in :
Consider an increase in  rst. Since qz < 0; an increase in  reduces the value
of the nominal interest rate at each point in time, implying that T + 1 must be larger
to allow for a larger natural rate. The postponed exit time serves as further stimulus to
output and ination. In contrast, an increase in  raises qz, thereby raising the value
for the nominal interest rate at each point in time. This implies a sooner exit time, since
the higher value for qz can o¤set an earlier lower value for the natural rate of interest.
The earlier exit time mitigates the stimulus associated with the increase in :
Calibration and Impulse Response We illustrate the quantitative e¤ects of our
policy proposal using the RBC parameterization from Adam and Billi (2006),
 = 1;  = 0:99;  = 0:057; ' = 1:5; 'y = 0:5:
All values are expressed at quarterly rates. The values for the elasticity of substitution
and the discount factor are standard. The value of  is consistent with 44% of rms
adjusting their price each period.
We compare three alternative values for the initial state following the extreme adverse
shock (w), measured at quarterly rates, w 2 f0:018; 0:021; 0:024g : With { = 0:01; each of
these shocks sends the natural rate below zero. We allow the extreme shock to exhibit
three di¤erent values for persistence (w), including w = 0:80, the value Adam and Billi
(2006) estimate as the variance of the real rate shock, and higher values of 0.85 and 0.90.
For purposes of comparison, we also compute impulse response functions under discretion
and optimal policy for the same shocks. The solution under discretion16 is equivalent
to our policy with  = 0; and we characterize the solution under commitment in the
appendix.
We use a numerical algorithm to choose values for ; T; and  to minimize loss. We
choose a value for  and nd the loss-minimizing value for 
 and the associated T: We
16With certainty, discretion is a Truncated Taylor Rule with an ination target of zero.
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allow  to take on alternative values and nd associated values for 
 and T: We choose
the loss-minimizing value for  and the associated values for 
 and T as the global
minimum.
We plot impulse response functions for the highest persistence (0.90) and largest shock
case (0.024) in Figure 1 below. The shock is so large and persistent that the natural rate
of interest does not become positive until the tenth quarter after the shock. We chose this
large value for the shock to come close to replicating the long period of the ZLB following
the nancial crisis in the US.
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Figure 1: Impulse Response
Our policy generates time paths for ination and the output gap which are almost
indistinguishable from those of optimal policy. Both policies stimulate compared to dis-
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cretionary policy because both make two promises which are not made under discretion.
The rst promise is to keep the nominal interest rate low for a longer period of time than
absolutely necessary, and the second is to exit the ZLB with positive values for ina-
tion and the output gap. Both raise inationary expectations and stimulate compared to
discretion.
Under discretionary policy, the nominal interest rate exactly follows the natural in-
terest rate once it becomes positive. In contrast, our policy does not allow the nominal
interest rate to become positive until the twelfth quarter after the shock, while under
optimal policy it takes until the fourteenth. Upon exiting the zero lower bound, discre-
tionary policy immediately sets ination and the output gap at their optimal values of
zero, while both our policy and commitment retain non-zero values of both. At the point
of exit from the ZLB, our policy sets the ination target to 0.057% at a quarterly rate,
allowing it to fall at rate  = 0:17 over time. Actual ination is lower at 0.02%, and
both the ination target and actual ination fall to zero after two quarters. For smaller
shocks and/or smaller persistence, both the magnitudes of the deviations from long-run
equilibrium and the length of the adjustment period are shorter.
Table 1 compares values for loss across all three policies: time-varying ination tar-
get, discretion, and commitment. As expected, loss for any given policy is increasing in
both the magnitude of the shock and its persistence. Holding both the magnitude and
persistence of the shock constant, expected loss is considerably greater under discretion
than with the time-varying ination target. Loss under discretion ranges from 2.7 to 7.7
times as large as loss under our ination-target policy. Additionally, the relative size of
the loss under discretion, compared with the ination-target policy, is increasing in both
the magnitude of the shock and its persistence. In contrast, expected loss under our
policy is only slightly larger (between 3 and 5 percent larger) than expected loss under
commitment, and there is no relationship between either the magnitude of shock or its
persistence and relative loss.
Table 1 also compares optimal values for the ination target and its persistence for
shocks of di¤erent magnitudes and persistence. The ination target is always small,
ranging from 0.104% to 0.348% at annual rates. Optimal persistence is often zero, and
is always small, implying that our policy returns to discretion quickly after exiting the
ZLB (but we exit the ZLB one to two periods later). The optimal exit time (T + 1) is
increasing in both the magnitude of the shock and in its persistence.
The discrete nature of T in the calibrated solution seems to play a role in the determi-
nation of optimal values for the ination target and its persistence. A discrete change in
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the value for T provides a large change in stimulus. To understand, we begin by constrain-
ing persistence to be zero, and determine the optimal ination target and exit time. The
value for the ination target is often constrained by the largest value possible without trig-
gering an increase in the value for exit time. When this occurs, an increase in persistence
allows an increase in the ination target without changing exit time, thereby providing
a small amount of additional stimulus. If exit time were not discrete, we conjecture that
the persistence variable would not be necessary.
Table 1: Alternative Policies under Di¤erent Shocks
u1 u %
  T %loss T
D TC loss
D
loss
loss
lossC
0.018 0.8 .035 0.0 4 0.012 3 5 2.73 1.04
0.018 0.85 .043 0.11 5 0.023 4 6 3.20 1.04
0.018 0.9 .026 0.0 8 0.060 6 9 4.53 1.04
0.021 0.8 .042 0.0 5 0.035 4 6 2.95 1.04
0.021 0.85 .067 0.33 6 0.066 5 8 3.64 1.05
0.021 0.9 .058 0.38 9 0.194 7 11 5.81 1.04
0.024 0.8 .069 0.0 6 0.078 4 7 3.12 1.04
0.024 0.85 .087 0.39 7 0.158 6 9 4.13 1.05
0.024 0.9 .057 0.17 11 0.434 9 13 7.68 1.03
3.2.2 Uncertainty
In this section, we add a moderate amount of uncertainty and simulate the solution
of the model under uncertainty. We again present the simulations for the largest adverse
shock with the greatest persistence. Our policy proposal for the ination target is almost
identical under certainty as under uncertainty.
Solution Algorithm
Discretize AR(1) Innovation The rst step is to discretize the AR(1) process
for vt into a Markov chain with a discrete number of states. We let the autoregressive
coe¢ cient be v = 0:80; as in Adam and Billi (2006), but we cannot let variance be as
high as theirs because in their simulations, innovations from this disturbance alone send
the economy to the ZLB about every ve years. Our assumption is that these innovations
alone never breech the ZLB.
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We restrict the uncertainty with the assumption that the worst state in the V distri-
bution brings the economy to a quarterly nominal interest rate of i = 0:0025; the lowest
value for the federal funds rate over the period in Adam and Billi (2006). This sets the
worst state at
VN = {  0:0025 = 0:0076:
We set the standard deviation according to Tauchens formulation such that we obtain VN
as the worst state in an approximation including 2.5 standard deviations and nine states.
This implies that the standard deviation of our process is 0.1824%. We further reduce
the variance and the probability of returning to the ZLB by assuming that the economy
can move at most one state in one period by placing the probabilities for all states more
distant on the one-period-distant state.
Finally, uncertainty a¤ects the authoritys choice of persistence in the ination target
on two counts. First, we will demonstrate that uncertainty increases the expected persis-
tence of positive deviations for ination and the output gap, suggesting that even more
persistence would not reduce loss. Second, uncertainty reduces the discreteness associated
with the implied exit time since we replace a discrete known exit time with probabilities.
Both reduce the desirability of positive persistence in the ination target. Since optinal
persistence is low under certainty and is most likely even lower under uncertainty, we
simplify by setting persistence to zero under uncertainty.
Critical Dates The economy exits the ZLB once the nominal interest rate in equation
(20) becomes positive. This requires that the natural rate of interest reaches a critical
value dened by the ination target and given by
rct =  qz:
Writing the natural rate in terms of critical times (Tc (j)) ; where j indexes the state,
critical times are determined implicitly for each of the N possible values of v by
v (j) =  ({+ qz)  Tc(j) 1w w j 2 f1; Ng :
At time Tc (j) ; the economy exits the ZLB if it has not already exited and if it is in state
j or lower.
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Forward Solution The next step is forward solution of the equation
Zt = A
 1EtZt+1 + A 1arnt ;
where we begin in period t = 1 with the extreme shock from the W distribution and
with a zero value for the shock from the V distribution. We solve this equation for the
value of Zt; conditional on either remaining at the ZLB in period t or exiting the ZLB in
period t. At each iteration, we use the probability of being in each state, and therefore
the probability of either continuing at the ZLB or exiting, to compute the expectation.
For the expectation upon exit, we need to allow for the possibility that the economy could
return to the ZLB.
We solve ZxTx ; the vector containing the output gap and ination conditional upon
exit in time T x, in the appendix to yield
ZxTx = b
 +BETxZxTx+1
where
b =

I + A 1a'
 1
A 1az B =

I + A 1a'
 1
A 1 ' =

'y; '

:
The value conditional on starting away from the ZLB is simply
Zxt = BEtZ
x
t+1; (21)
since the ination target is zero one period after exit from the ZLB. We obtain numerical
solutions for Zxt backwards by picking a time far enough in the future such that the natural
rate is positive in all states. At this point, ination and the output gap in all states are
zero and the expectation is zero.
Dene E
 
Rt+1j1; N

as the expected value of the natural interest rate across all eligible
states, conditional on remaining at the ZLB and
 
 t+1;sj1; N

as the probability of exit
in state s, both at time t+ 1 and conditional on starting in period 1 and state N as
E
 
Rt+1j1; N

=
vX
vc2
8<::::
vX
vct
24 vX
 vct+1
rnt+1p (vt+1jvt)
35 p (vtjvt 1) :::
9=; p (v2jv1) ; (22)
 
 t+1;sj1; N

=
vX
vc2
8<::::
vX
vct
h
p

v
c(s)
t+1 jvt
i
p (vtjvt 1) :::
9=; p (v2jv1) :
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The term vc(s)t+1 is used to denote the critical value of v at time t+ 1 for which exit would
occur in state s: In general, the value for Zt;j; the vector with the output gap and ination
at time t; conditional on starting in state j and period t at the ZLB, is given by
Zt;j = 
t;j + 	t;j; (23)
where

t;j =
TX
i=t+1
At i 1aE (Rijt; j) + A 1arnt
and
	t;j =
T+1X
i=t+1
NX
s=1
At i (b +BEi;sZi+1)
 
 i;sjt; j

:
Expected loss is computed by weighing the squared time-t; state-j values of the output
gap and ination from equation (23) by their probabilities beginning from time 1, state
N; together with the squared time-t; state-j values of the output gap and ination if the
economy has exited the ZLB from Zxt in equation (21), multiplied by their probabilities
beginning from time 1, state N . Expected time paths are computed analogously.
Impulse Response under Uncertainty The optimal value for the ination target
upon exit under uncertainty is 0.046%. Expected loss increases to 0.585% due to variance
of ination and the output gap along the time path. Figure 2 contains impulse-response
functions for the expected paths for the output gap, ination rate, and nominal interest
rate in the two cases. Under uncertainty, there is more persistence in ination and the
output gap than under certainty, implying that the optimal amount of stimulus should
be slightly less. This explains the slightly lower initial values for ination and the output
gap under uncertainty.17 The expected path for the nominal interest rate does rise earlier
due to the possibility that with favorable shocks, the economy could exit the ZLB sooner
than under a zero ination target. However, our overall assessment is that the expected
time paths under uncertainty are very close to the time paths under certainty.
17We conrm that this is not due to restricting persistence to be zero by comparing paths for a case in
which optimal persistence is zero under certainty and obtain identical patterns.
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Figure 2: E¤ects of Uncertainty
In contrast, consideration of uncertainty substantially raises the relative loss of fol-
lowing a Taylor Rule with a zero ination target18 compared to following one with the
optimal ination target. Expected loss under the zero ination target is eleven and a half
times that under the optimal ination target. Therefore, consideration of uncertainty
strengthens the argument for adding the time-varying ination target to the Taylor Rule.
18With uncertainty the truncated Taylor Rule with a zero ination target di¤ers from optimal policy
under discretion. Under optimal discretion, the monetary authority is choosing the nominal interest rate
to minimize loss, knowing that they will rechoose in the future. The possibility of returning to the ZLB
in the future will reduce output and ination leading to the choice of a lower interest rate. Under the
truncated Taylor Rule, they are choosing the nominal interest rate according to the Taylor Rule.
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4 Using the Ination Target to Avoid the ZLB
Consider the possibility of raising the ination target and its persistence in the period
of the shock by a large enough amount that the economy exits the ZLB immediately in
period 1. Equivalently, the economy receives a shock in period 1, sending it to the worst
possible state, and monetary policy is so stimulative that ination and the output gap
rise su¢ ciently to keep the nominal interest rate from ever hitting the ZLB. The recession
is reversed into a boom.
In this case, the rst period when the nominal interest rate becomes positive is the
period of the shock. This implies that the solutions for output and ination are given by
equation (19) with the nominal interest rate given by equation (20).
Equation (20) reveals that for an increase in the ination target to raise the nominal
interest rate,  must be large enough to make q positive. In the New Keynesian model,
the direct e¤ect of an increase in the ination target is a reduction in the nominal interest
rate, and this stimulates demand and ination. However, the increase in the ination
target also raises expectations of ination, further stimulating demand, and through the
Taylor Rule responses to ination and the output gap, leads to an increase in the interest
rate. For large enough persistence of the short-run ination target, this indirect e¤ect
dominates, implying that an increase in the ination target raises the nominal interest
rate.19
With  set large enough to assure q > 0; we can choose 
 such that the nominal
interest rate is always above zero, thereby avoiding the ZLB and validating the above
solutions for output and ination.
Assuming that the economy receives a shock from the W distribution at time t = 1;
the value for the nominal interest rate, conditional on not receiving another shock from
the W distribution, can be expressed as
it = {   1

t 1w

! +
v
1  w

+ th=2
t h
v ~vh

+ qzt 1 
:
We must choose  and w to assure that it > 0; allowing the economy to avoid the
liquidity trap. Note that if the economy continues to receive the worst shock possible
19This is why calibrated models fail to nd a liquidity e¤ect of a negative interest rate shock when
persistence is high.
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from the V distribution from t = 2 going forward, then
ut = 
t 1
w

! +
v
1  w

+
v
1  v
 
1  t 1v

:
The nominal interest rate in this case becomes
it = {  
 1v
1  v
   1

t 1w ! + v

t 1w
1  w
  
t 1
v
1  v

+ qzt 1  > 0: (24)
The values for  and  must be chosen such that the nominal interest rate is positive
for all t: Note, rst, that this requires   w: To understand this, divide the right-hand
side of equation (24) by t to yield
1
t

{  
 1v
1  v

   1

w

t "
! + v
 
1
1  w
 

v
w
t
1
1  v
!#
+
qz

> 0:
As t increases, the negative term explodes unless   w:
Given   w, the constraint in equation (24) is most binding for t = 1: Therefore,
setting t = 1 yields a lower bound on the ination target as
 
 

{   1v
1 v

+  1
h
! + v

1
1 w  
1
1 v
i
qz
=
 

{   1v
1 w

+  1!
qz
(25)
=
 {+  1w
qz
> 0:
To satisfy the lower bound, we assume that the ination target is set at
 =
 {+  1w + 
qz
; (26)
where  is a small positive number. The nominal interest rate with the worst draw from
W followed by the worst draws from V thereafter, is given by
it =

{  
 1v
1  v
 
1  t 1

+ 1!
 
t 1   t 1w

+ 1v

t 1   t 1w
1  w
  
t 1
   t 1v
1  v

+t 1  > 0:
(27)
Setting t = 1 reveals that the interest rate in the period of the shock is given by ,
implying that  > 0 is su¢ cient to avoid the ZLB. In subsequent periods, the interest
rate rises even if the economy receives the worst possible shock from the V distribution.20
20This assumption keeps us from having to model the e¤ect on the expected ination target if the
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Therefore, the policy keeps the nominal interest rate positive. The actual interest rate
evolves as
it = {
 
1  t 1

+  1

! +
 1v
1  w
 
t 1   t 1w
  th=2t hv ~vh+ t 1  > 0: (28)
4.1 Impulse Response
To compute impulse response functions with  and  chosen to exit the ZLB immedi-
ately, we consider the three alternative values for the extreme adverse shock together with
the three di¤erent degrees of persistence. For each case, we set   w and large enough
to assure q > 0: Then,  is set according to equation (26) with  = 0:025. We iterate over
alternative values for ; and choose the loss-minimizing value of 0.92, for all shocks and
persistences. Impulse response functions for the largest-shock, highest-persistence case
are plotted in Figure 3.
The ination target rises to 2.1% at a quarterly rate stimulating ination to rise to
1.8% and the output gap to 2.9%, both at quarterly rates. The nominal interest rate rises
slightly above zero. The increase in the ination target together with its strong persistence
reverses the recession into a sustained boom. This boom has costs, with welfare loss over
six times as high as under discretion. And in the case of the least extreme and least
persistent shock, welfare costs are over 200 times as large as those under discretion. Billi
(2011) argues that the cost of slipping to the unfavorable stable equilibrium following an
extreme adverse shock are so high that even the high welfare costs might be justiable.
Therefore, raising the ination target and its persistence su¢ ciently to avoid the ZLB is
a feasible policy, but one with high welfare costs.
economy could return to the "worst possible state," thereby returning the ination target to :
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Figure 3: Avoid ZLB
5 Conclusions
The nominal interest rate cannot fall below zero. The economy enters a liquidity trap
when a large adverse demand shock sends the nominal interest rate to zero as policy-
makers try to stimulate the economy. We propose that the monetary authority adopt a
time-varying ination target at the ZLB with the same zeal with which they have adopted
a xed ination target away from the ZLB.
In the event of a large adverse demand shock, which sends the economy into the
liquidity trap under the conventional Taylor Rule, the monetary authority raises the
ination target and promises to retain that target until after the economy exits the ZLB.
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After exiting the ZLB the ination target rapidly returns to zero. The increase in the
ination target postpones the date on which the monetary authority will raise the interest
rate, the exit date from the ZLB. Inationary expectations rise, stimulating the economy.
Ination and the output gap are higher along an adjustment path characterized by small
negative and positive deviations compared with the large and falling negative deviations
under discretionary policy.
The reductions in loss under the proposed policy compared with discretion are sub-
stantial and are increasing in the magnitude and persistence of the shock. Additionally,
the policy achieves almost all the gains of optimal commitment. The commitment to a
time-varying ination target with low persistence is a commitment to exit the ZLB with
both a slightly positive ination and output gap, and at a later date than required under
discretion. The exit date is one to two quarters greater than under discretion with the
date increasing in the severity of the shock creating the ZLB and its persistence. The
ination target upon exit is less than one half of one percent at an annual rate. The
policy is implementable because it relies on the Taylor Rule with the Taylor Principle
after exit from the ZLB. Consideration of uncertainty further raises the gains to policy
with an optimal ination target compared to a Taylor Rule with a zero ination target.
The policy does require commitment because it is dynamically inconsistent. The
monetary authority must maintain its commitment to the ination target and the implied
lower nominal interest rate beyond the date on which the natural rate of interest becomes
positive. But, given the assumption embodied in the Taylor Principle, that the monetary
authority can commit to "blow up the economy" (Cochrane 2011) in the event of a sunspot
shock, this seems a small additional commitment.
Our policy produces an outcome similar to that of commitment, implying that it
provides a way to implement a policy which closely approximates optimal policy. Im-
plementability is important because it ensures local uniqueness of the equilibrium. Ad-
ditionally, communicating commitment to an ination target, which rapidly returns to
zero after exit from the ZLB, seems relatively straight-foward compared with complicated
paths for interest rates under optimal commitment.
The policy shares one attribute with a policy recently suggested by Cochrane (2013),
where he proposes exiting the ZLB at a positive rate of ination, but on the same date
as implied by discretion. Our policy allows higher welfare by proposing a later exit date.
Our analysis does not support a policy to raise the ination target and its persistence,
and thereby inationary expectations, su¢ ciently to immediately escape the liquidity
trap, unless the expected loss generated by the possibility that the economy could transit
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to the unfavorable equilibrium is very large (Billi 2011). Welfare costs to immediate exit
from the ZLB are very large, even though they are substantially smaller than they would
be with policies to create a permanent increase in the ination target.
The nancial crisis which began in 2007 created a growth industry for papers dealing
with liquidity traps. Most of them developed unconventional monetary policies, many of
which were implemented. Yet, in the United States and Japan, we remain in liquidity
traps. Our paper is about conventional monetary policy under a Taylor Rule. There is
no role for unconventional monetary policy in simple New Keynesian models. It is also
noteworthy that our policy of promising an increase in short-run ination has not been
adopted by countries in liquidity traps. The US policy of keeping nominal interest rates
at zero for a substantial period of time could be interpreted as an increase in the ination
target if it were not accompanied by concerns about "exit strategies" to keep ination
low once the economy recovers. Our analysis implies that some positive ination can be
part of an optimal policy response to a severly adverse demand shock which sends the
economy to the ZLB.
6 Appendix: Solution under Optimal Policy with Com-
mitment
This appendix follows Jung, Teranishi, and Watanabe (2005) with a few exceptions
and can be omitted from the published version.
The relevant Lagrangian is,
L = 1
2
E1
1X
t=1
t 1
 
2t + y
2
t

+ 21;t [yt+1   yt    (it   t+1   rnt )] + 22;t [t   t+1   yt]
	
where, 1;t and 2;t are Lagrange multipliers. All values should be interpreted as expec-
tations conditional on information in period 1. First order conditions with respect to
t; yt; it; 1;t and 2;t are,
t   

1;t 1 + 2;t   2;t 1 = 0 (29)
yt + 1;t  
1

1;t 1   2;t = 0 (30)
it1;t = 0 (31)
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it  0 (32)
1;t  0 (33)
yt+1   yt    (it   t+1   rnt ) = 0 (34)
t   t+1   yt = 0 (35)
Following Jung et al (2005), we assume that, it = 0 and 1;t > 0 for t = 1; 2; :::; T
c and
it > 0 and 1;t = 0 for t = T
c + 1; T c + 2; ::::. We divide the entire time period in three
parts to solve the dynamics under commitment.
6.1 Period t = 1; 2; :::; T c
We write equations (34) and (35) as,
Zt+1 = AZt   arnt ; (36)
and equations (29) and (30) as,
t = Ct 1  DZt; (37)
where
Zt =
"
yt
t
#
; t =
"
1;t
2;t
#
;
A =
24 1 +    
 

 
1

 35 ; a = " 
0
#
;
C =
24 1+  



1
35 ; D = "  
0 1
#
:
A forward looking solution of equation (36) yields,
Zt =  t + A
 (T c t+1)ZT c+1 (38)
where,
 t =
T cX
k=t
A (k t+1)arnk :
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A forward solution of equation (37) yields
t =

C 1DZt+1 + C 2DZt+2 + C 3DZt+3 + ::::

(39)
=
1X
k=t+1
C(t k)DZk
Solving equation (39) as a function of the initial condition 0 = 0 yields,
t = C
t0  
tX
k=1
Ct kDZk (40)
 
tX
k=1
C(t k)DZk:
Therefore from equation (40) we have,
T =  
TX
t=1
C(T t)DZt (41)
6.2 Period t = T c + 1
Equation (2), (29) and (30) at t = T c + 1 with 1;T c+1 = 0 yield,
 yT c+1 + T c+1   T c+2 = 0 (42)
T c+1 + 2;T c+1 =


1;T c + 2;T c (43)
and,
yT c+1   2;T c+1 =
1

1;T c (44)
6.3 Period t = T c + 2; T c + 3; :::
Equations (29) and (30) with 1;T c+1 = 1;T c+2 = ::: = 0 yield,"
t+1
2;t
#
= M
"
t
2;t 1
#
(45)
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where,
M =
24

1+
2


 
  2


 1 1
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Matrix M has two characteristic roots, 1 > 1 and 2 2 (0; 1). Imposing initial values to
eliminate the unstable root yields the solution of equation (45) as
t+1 = (1  2)2;T c+1t T
c 1
2 ; (46)
2;t = 2;T c+1
t T c 1
2 : (47)
Equation (46) implies
T c+2 = (1  2)2;T c+1 (48)
Equations (42), (43), (44) along with equation (48) can be written as,"
ZT c+1
2;T c+1
#
= F 1HT c (49)
where
F =
264   1 f  (1  2)g0 1 1
 0  
375 H =
2664
0 0



1
1


0
3775
Solution of equation (49) yields
ZT+1 = hT (50)
2;T+1 = h

1




  

1;T + 2;T

; (51)
where
 =
"
1




+ (1 +  (1  2))


1

h
2+(1 2)

+ 
i
2 +  (1  2)
#
;
and
h =
1
(1 +  (1  2)) + 2
:
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6.4 Algorithm
Begin with equation (41). Substitute equation (17) for Zt and equation (50) for ZT c+1
to yield
T c =  
T cX
t=1
C(T
c t)DZt
=  
T cX
t=1
C(T
c t)D
 
 t + A
 (T c t+1)ZT c+1

=  
T cX
t=1
C(T
c t)D
 
 t + A
 (T c t+1)hT c

=  
T cX
t=1
C(T
c t)D t   h
T cX
t=1
C(T
c t)DA (T
c t+1)T c
T c =  
"
I + h
T cX
t=1
C(T
c t)DA (T
c t+1)
# 1 T cX
t=1
C(T
c t)D t (52)
Note, equation (52) determines t = T c as the time period such that 1;t > 0 for t =
1; 2; :::; T c, i.e., t = T c is the last period when 1;t > 0. Once, T c is known, equation
(49) solves ZT c+1 and 2;T c+1. Using, ZT c+1, equation (17) solves Zt for t = 1; 2; :::; T
c.
Equation (46) and (47) then solve t and 2;t respectively for t = T
c + 2; T c + 2; ::::. Then
from equation (30) we have yt for t = T c + 2; T c + 3; :::: as,
yt =


2;t (53)
and it for t = T c + 2; T c + 2; ::: from equation (1) as,
it = r
n
t + t+1 + 
 1 (yt+1   yt) : (54)
7 Appendix: Solution under Uncertainty after Exit-
ing ZLB
We proceed with the solution by rst solving for Zxt ; the vector containing values for
the output gap and ination after exit. The vector evolves as
Zxt = A
 1EtZxt+1 + A
 1a (rnt   it) ; (55)
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where
it = max(0; r
n
t + 'Z
x
t );
with
' =

'y; '

:
We solve equation (55) forward to yield
Zxt = A
 1a (rnt   it) + A 1Et

A 1a
 
rnt+1   it+1

+ Et+1Z
x
t+2

=
TN tX
h=0
A hEt

A 1a
 
rnt+h   it+h

;
' =

'y; '

:
If the nominal interest rate is positive, we can substitute to yield
Zxt =  A 1a'Zxt + A 1EtZxt+1:
Solving for Zxt yields
Zxt =

I + A 1a'
 1
A 1EtZxt+1:
Substituting into the Taylor Rule for the nominal interest rate yields
it = max(0; r
n
t + '

I + A 1a'
 1
A 1EtZxt+1); (56)
and
Zxt = A
 1a (rnt   it) + A 1EtZxt+1:
We solve the problem backwards. Begin with a time period for which the natural rate
of interest is positive even in the worst state and call this period T n:
ETnZ
x
Tn+1 = 0
The monetary authority will always be able to set the nominal interest rate equal to the
positive natural rate and set the output gap and ination each to zero from T n forward.
From equation (56), the nominal interest rate in period T n equals the maximum of zero
and natural rate,
iTn = max(0; r
n
Tn)
ZxTn = A
 1a (rnTn   iTn) :
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Back up one period to yield the expression for the vector Zx one period earlier as
ZxTn 1 = A
 1a
 
rnTn 1   iTn 1

+ A 1ETn 1ZxTn
with the nominal interest rate given by
iTn 1 = max(0; rnTn 1 + '

I + A 1a'
 1
A 1ETn 1ZxTn):
We continue backwards until we reach the period at which the economy exits from the
ZLB.
In the period in which the economy exits the ZLB, the nominal interest rate is adjusted
downwards by the ination target such that
iTx = r
n
Tx   z + 'ZxTx
with
ZxTx = A
 1a (rnTx   iTx) + A 1ETxZxTx+1:
Substituting the interest rate yields
ZxTx = A
 1a (z   'ZxTx) + A 1ETxZxTx+1:
Solving for ZxTx yields
ZxTx =

I + A 1a'
 1 
A 1az + A 1ETxZxTx+1

= b +BETxZxTx+1
where
b =

I + A 1a'
 1
A 1az;
T na 2 x 1 vector and
B =

I + A 1a'
 1
A 1;
a 2 x 2 matrix. Therefore, the nominal interest rate in the exit period (T x) is given by
iTx = r
n
Tx   z + 'ZxTx
rnTx   z + '
 
b +BETxZxTx+1

= rnTx + qz
 + 'BETxZxTx+1:
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